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Abstract
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the impact of a
balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits. It considers both a strict rule which
cannot be circumvented and a rule that can be overridden by a super-majority of legislators. A strict rule
leads to a gradual but substantial reduction in the level of public debt. In the short run, citizens will be
worse oﬀ as public spending is reduced and taxes are raised to bring down debt. In the long run, the
benefits of a lower debt burden must be weighed against the costs of greater volatility in taxes and less
responsive public good provision. To quantify these eﬀects, the model is calibrated to the U.S. economy
using data from 1940-2005. While the long run net benefits are positive, they are outweighed by the short
run costs of debt reduction. A rule with a super-majority override has no eﬀect on citizen welfare or fiscal
policy.
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1 Introduction
A recurring debate in American politics concerns the desirability of amending the U.S. constitution
to require that the federal government operate under a balanced budget rule (BBR). Calls for such
a “balanced budget amendment” started in the late 1970s and became particularly strident during
the high deficit era in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, in 1995 the House approved a balanced budget
amendment by 300-132, but the Senate fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority that is needed
for constitutional amendments (Schick (2007)).1 Eﬀorts to pass a balanced budget amendment
continued right up until the recent economic crisis and will doubtless resurface once the economy
recovers.2
While there is no shortage of policy discussion on the pros and cons of passing a balanced budget
amendment, there has been remarkably little economic analysis of its likely impact. Indeed, we
are not aware of any analysis that has tried to shed light, qualitatively or quantitatively, on the
likely impact on fiscal policy and citizen welfare. Doubtless this reflects the inherent diﬃculty of
developing an analysis that even begins to capture the key trade-oﬀs. Since it is clear that in a
world in which policy is set by a benevolent planner a BBR can only distort policy and hurt citizen
welfare, one must begin with a political economy model of fiscal policy. Moreover, the model must
be suﬃciently rich to be able to capture the short and long run consequences of imposing a BBR
on policy and welfare.
The political economy model of fiscal policy recently developed by Battaglini and Coate (2008)
(BC) appears a potentially useful framework in which to analyze the issue. The BC framework
begins with a tax smoothing model of fiscal policy of the form studied by Barro (1979), Lucas
and Stokey (1983), and Aiyagari et. al. (2002). It departs from the tax smoothing literature by
assuming that policy choices are made by a legislature rather than a benevolent planner. Moreover,
it incorporates the friction that legislators can redistribute tax dollars back to their districts via
1 The U.S. Constitution can be amended in two ways. The first is by a two-thirds vote in both the House and
Senate followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states. The second is by two-thirds of the states calling a
Constitutional Convention at which three-fourths of the states must ratify the amendment. The latter route to
adopting a balanced budget amendment was pursued in the late 1970s but fell four states short of the two-thirds
necessary to call a Convention. See Morgan (1998) for a discussion of this eﬀort.
2 In the 110th Congress (Jan 2007-Dec 2008) balanced budget bills were pending in both the House and the
Senate. The Senate bill (SJ Res 24) was sponsored by Senators Lindsay Graham and Jim DeMint and the House
bill (HJ Res 45) was sponsored by Representative Kirsten Gillibrand and 31 cosponsors. These bills have been
reintroduced in the current 111th Congress in the form of SJ Res 27 and HJ Res 1. However, their passage in the
near future seems highly unlikely.
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pork-barrel spending. This friction means that equilibrium debt levels are too high implying that,
in principle, imposing a BBR has the potential to improve welfare.
In this paper, we employ the BC model to analyze the impact of imposing a BBR on the U.S.
federal government. Our hope is not only to contribute to the substantive debate concerning the
balanced budget amendment, but also to develop an appreciation for how useful the BC model
is for analyzing U.S. fiscal issues. The paper begins by calibrating the BC model to the U.S.
economy using data from 1940-2005 and argues that the calibrated model fits the data suﬃciently
well to make using it as a framework to underpin the policy analysis interesting.3 We then study,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, the consequences of imposing a BBR. We model a BBR as
a constitutional requirement that tax revenues must be suﬃcient to cover spending and the costs
of servicing the debt. Thus, budget surpluses are permitted, but not deficits.4 We consider both
a strict BBR which cannot be circumvented by the legislators and a BBR which can be overridden
by a super-majority of legislators.5
Imposing a strict BBR leads to a gradual reduction in the level of government debt. In the
calibrated model, the long run reduction in the debt/GDP ratio is 89%. This is surprising because
the BBR only restricts legislators not to run deficits and thus one might have expected the debt
level to remain constant. The reduction occurs because a BBR, by restricting future policies,
increases the expected cost of taxation and makes public savings more valuable as a buﬀer against
future shocks. The reduction in debt means that the interest costs of servicing debt will be lower,
reducing pressure on the budget. In the calibrated model, average tax rates become lower and
public good provision becomes higher than in the steady state of the unconstrained equilibrium.
Pork-barrel spending also becomes higher as debt falls. However, the inability to use debt to
smooth taxes, leads to more volatile tax rates and less responsive public good provision.
The impact of imposing a strict BBR on citizen welfare is complex. Initially, citizens experience
a reduction in average contemporaneous utility, as legislators reduce public spending and increase
3 This is the first calibration of the BC model to a real economy.
4 This is consistent with the balanced budget amendments that have been considered by Congress. As reported
in Whalen (1995), the balanced budget amendment considered as part of the Contract with America in 1994
required that “total outlays for any fiscal year do not exceed total receipts for that year”. Total receipts are defined
as “all receipts of the United States except those derived from borrowing” and total outlays are defined as “all
outlays of the United States except those for the repayment of debt principle”.
5 The amendments considered by the U.S. Congress typically allow the BBR to be waived with support from
at least 60% of legislators in both the House and Senate.
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taxes to pay down debt. As debt declines, in principle they may or may not be better oﬀ. This
depends on whether the benefits of a lower debt burden are oﬀset by the costs of more volatile
tax rates and less responsive public good provision. In the calibrated model, steady state welfare
is actually increased by 2.85%. However, when account is taken of the short run costs, imposing
a strict BBR reduces welfare.
The analysis of a BBR which can be overridden is much more straightforward: imposing a
BBR with a super-majority override will have no eﬀect on fiscal policy or citizen welfare. Such
a BBR will only have an eﬀect if imposed at the foundation of the state before debt has risen to
equilibrium levels. Intuitively, this is because in the BC model, once debt has reached equilibrium
levels, additional debt will be issued only when it is in the interests of all legislators to do so,
rather than just a minimum winning coalition. We argue that this result reflects the stationarity
of the BC model and would not necessarily apply in a growing economy.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a quick review
of the debate concerning the desirability of a balanced budget amendment and the academic
literature on BBRs. Section 3 briefly outlines the BC model of fiscal policy. Section 4 explains
how we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and discusses its suitability as a framework to
underpin the policy analysis. Section 5 studies, qualitatively and quantitatively, the impact of
imposing a strict BBR on equilibrium fiscal policies and welfare. Section 6 deals with the case of
a BBR with super-majority override. Section 7 discusses the results and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
Advocates of a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. constitution see a BBR as a necessary tool
to limit the size of government and the level of public debt.6 Opponents argue that a BBR would
restrict government’s ability to use debt for beneficial purposes like tax smoothing, counter-cyclical
Keynesian fiscal policy, or public investment. Even if legislators tend to accumulate ineﬃciently
high debt levels, this does not mean that they will not use debt on the margin in ways that
enhance social welfare. Advocates respond that some flexibility may be preserved by allowing the
BBR to be overridden in times of war or with a supermajority vote of the legislature. Moreover,
6 Economists who have advocated a balanced budget amendment include Nobel Laureates James Buchanan and
Milton Friedman, and former chairman of President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors William Niskanen.
For a useful introduction to the policy debate see Sabato (2007) pp. 54-69.
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investment expenditures might be exempted by the creation of separate capital budgets.7
A further common argument against a balanced budget amendment is that the BBR will be
circumvented by bookkeeping gimmicks and hence will be ineﬀective. Such gimmicks include the
establishment of entities, such as public authorities or corporations, that are authorized to borrow
money but whose debt is not an obligation of the state. Another gimmick involves selling public
assets and recording the proceeds as current revenue. Moreover, critics argue that this process of
circumvention will create a lack of transparency and accountability. Relatedly, critics fear that a
BBR might lead Congress to further their social objectives by ineﬃcient non-budgetary measures.
For example, by imposing mandates on state and local governments or by imposing additional
regulations on the private sector. Finally, critics worry whether the enforcement of a BBR will
blur the line between the legislative and judicial branches of government.8
The academic literature that relates to the desirability of a balanced budget amendment has
largely been devoted to the empirical question of whether the BBRs that are used in practice
actually have any eﬀect. Thus, the literature has honed in on the issue of the circumvention of
BBRs via accounting gimmicks and the like. Empirical investigation is facilitated by the fact that
BBRs are common at the state level in the U.S.. Moreover, not only is there significant variation
in the stringency of the diﬀerent rules, but this variation is plausibly exogenous since many of the
states adopted their BBRs as part of their founding constitutions.9 Researchers have explored
how this stringency impacts fiscal policy (see, for example, Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1995), Bohn and Inman (1996), Poterba (1994) and Rose (2006)). Importantly,
these studies find that stringency does matter for fiscal policy. For example, Poterba (1994) shows
that states with more stringent restraints were quicker to reduce spending and/or raise taxes in
response to negative revenue shocks than those without.10
Less work has been devoted to the basic theoretical question of whether, assuming that they
can be enforced and will not be circumvented, BBRs are desirable. In the optimal fiscal policy
literature, a number of authors point out that optimal policy will typically violate a BBR (see,
7 On separating capital and operating budgets see Bassetto with Sargent (2006).
8 On enforcement issues see Primo (2007).
9 Forty nine of the fifty U.S. states have some type of BBR (Vermont is the exception). Rhode Island was
the first state to adopt a BBR in 1842 and thirty six more states adopted them before the end of the nineteenth
century. See Savage (1988) for more on the history of BBRs and the importance of the balanced budget philosophy
in American politics more generally.
10 For overviews of this research see Inman (1996) and Poterba (1996).
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for example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994)). In the context
of the model developed by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), Stockman (2001) studies how
a benevolent government would set fiscal policy under a BBR and quantifies the welfare cost of
such a restraint. However, by omitting political economy considerations, none of this work allows
for the possibility that a BBR might have benefits. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Buchanan
(1995), Buchanan and Wagner (1977), Keech (1985) and Niskanen (1992) provide some interesting
discussion of the political economy reasons for a BBR, but do not provide frameworks in which to
evaluate the costs and benefits. Besley and Smart (2007) provide an interesting welfare analysis
of BBRs and other fiscal restraints within the context of a two period political agency model.
The key issue in their analysis is how having a BBR influences the flow of information to citizens
concerning the characteristics of their policy-makers. This is a novel angle on the problem to be
sure, but this argument has not, to this point, played a role in the policy debate.
In a precursor to this analysis, Battaglini and Coate (2008) briefly consider the desirability
of imposing a constitutional constraint at the foundation of the state that prevents government
from either running deficits or surpluses. They present a condition under which citizens will
be better oﬀ with such a constraint. This condition concerns the size of the economy’s tax base
relative to the size of the public spending needs. The analysis in this paper goes beyond this initial
exploration in four important ways. First, it considers a BBR that allows for budget surpluses and
hence public saving or debt reduction. Second, it assumes that the BBR is imposed after debt has
reached equilibrium levels rather than at the beginning of time. Third, it calibrates the model to
the U.S. economy and develops quantitative predictions concerning the impact of a BBR. Fourth,
it considers a BBR with a super-majority override.
3 The BC model
3.1 The economic environment
A continuum of infinitely-lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i = 1, ..., n. The
size of the population in each district is normalized to be one. There is a single (nonstorable)
consumption good, denoted by z, that is produced using a single factor, labor, denoted by l, with
the linear technology z = wl. There is also a public good, denoted by g, that can be produced
from the consumption good according to the linear technology g = z/p.
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Citizens consume the consumption good, benefit from the public good, and supply labor. Each
citizen’s per period utility function is
z +A ln g − l
(1+1/ε)
ε+ 1
, (1)
where ε > 0. The parameter A measures the value of the public good to the citizens. Citizens
discount future per period utilities at rate δ.
The value of the public good varies across periods in a random way, reflecting shocks to the
society such as wars and natural disasters. Specifically, in each period, A is the realization of a
random variable with range [A,A] and cumulative distribution function G(A). The function G is
continuously diﬀerentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly below by some positive
constant ξ > 0, so that for any pair of realizations such that A < A0, the diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A) is
at least as big as ξ(A0 −A).
There is a competitive labor market and competitive production of the public good. Thus, the
wage rate is equal to w and the price of the public good is p. There is also a market in risk-free,
one period bonds. The assumption of a constant marginal utility of consumption implies that the
equilibrium interest rate on these bonds must be ρ = 1/δ − 1.
3.2 Government policies
The public good is provided by the government. The government can raise revenue by levying
a proportional tax on labor income. It can also borrow and lend by selling and buying bonds.
Revenues can also be diverted to finance targeted district-specific monetary transfers which are
interpreted as (non-distortionary) pork-barrel spending.
Government policy in any period is described by an n+3-tuple {τ, g, b0, s1, ...., sn}, where τ is
the income tax rate; g is the amount of public good provided; b0 is the amount of bonds sold; and
si is the transfer to district i’s residents. When b0 is negative, the government is buying bonds. In
each period, the government must also repay the bonds that it sold in the previous period which
are denoted by b. The government’s initial debt level in period 1 is b0.
In a period in which government policy is {τ, g, b0, s1, ...., sn}, each citizen will supply l∗(τ) =
(εw(1 − τ))ε units of labor. A citizen in district i who simply consumes his net of tax earnings
and his transfer will obtain a per period utility of u(τ, g;A) + si, where
u(τ, g;A) =
εε(w(1− τ))ε+1
ε+ 1
+A ln g. (2)
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Since citizens are indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across time, their lifetime
expected utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoﬀ they would
obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period.
Government policies must satisfy three feasibility constraints.11 First, tax revenues must be
suﬃcient to cover public expenditures. To see what this implies, consider a period in which the
initial level of government debt is b and the policy choice is {τ, g, b0, s1, ...., sn}. Expenditure on
public goods and debt repayment is pg + (1 + ρ)b, tax revenue is R(τ) = nτwl∗(τ), and revenue
from bond sales is b0. Letting the net of transfer surplus be denoted by
B(τ, g, b0; b) = R(τ)− pg + b0 − (1 + ρ)b, (3)
the constraint requires that B(τ, g, b0; b) ≥
X
i
si. Second, district-specific transfers must be non-
negative (i.e., si ≥ 0 for all i). Third, the government cannot borrow more than it can repay
which requires that b0 is less than b = maxτ R(τ)/ρ.
3.3 The political process
Government policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of
the n districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. Since
all citizens have the same policy preferences, the identity of the representative is immaterial and
hence the selection process can be ignored. The legislature meets at the beginning of each period.
These meetings take only an insignificant amount of time, and representatives undertake private
sector work in the rest of the period just like everybody else. The aﬃrmative votes of q < n
representatives are required to enact any legislation.
To describe how legislative decision-making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the
beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is b and the value of the public good
is A. One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the first proposal, with each representative
having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is a policy {τ, g, b0, s1, ...., sn} that satisfies
the feasibility constraints. If the first proposal is accepted by q legislators, then it is implemented
and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature
11 There is also an additional constraint that the total amount of private sector income be larger than the amount
borrowed by the government. This requires that
P
i si + (1 + ρ)b + n(1 − r)w(εw(1 − r))ε exceed b0. Using the
budget balance condition for the government, this constraint amounts to the requirement that national income
nw(εw(1− r))ε exceed public good spending pg. This condition is easily satisfied in the calibration of the model
for the U.S. economy presented in Section 4. Thus, in the theoretical analysis, we will assume it is always satisfied.
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meets again with the diﬀerence being that the initial level of public debt is b0 and there is a new
realization of A. If, on the other hand, the first proposal is not accepted, another legislator is
chosen to make a proposal. There are T ≥ 2 such proposal rounds, each of which takes a negligible
amount of time. If the process continues until proposal round T , and the proposal made at that
stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose a default policy. The only restrictions
on the choice of a default policy are that it be feasible and that it treats districts uniformly (i.e.,
si = sj for all i, j).
3.4 Political equilibrium
Battaglini and Coate study the symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of this model. In this type
of equilibrium, any representative selected to propose at round r ∈ {1, ..., T} of the meeting at
some time t makes the same proposal and this depends only on the current level of public debt
(b), the value of the public good (A), and the bargaining round (r). Legislators are assumed to
vote for a proposal if they prefer it (weakly) to continuing on to the next proposal round. It is
assumed, without loss of generality, that at each round r proposals are immediately accepted by
at least q legislators, so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal
round. Accordingly, the policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium are those proposed
in the first round.
3.4.1 Characterization of equilibrium
To understand equilibrium behavior note that to get support for his proposal, the proposer must
obtain the votes of q−1 other representatives. Accordingly, given that utility is transferable, he is
eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q legislators. It is therefore as if a randomly
chosen minimum winning coalition (mwc) of q representatives is selected in each period and this
coalition chooses a policy choice to maximize its aggregate utility.
In any given state (b,A), there are two possibilities: either the mwc will provide pork to the
districts of its members or it will not. Providing pork requires reducing public good spending or
increasing taxation in the present or the future (if financed by issuing additional debt). When
b and/or A are suﬃciently high, the marginal benefit of spending on the public good and the
marginal cost of increasing taxation may be too high to make this attractive. In this case, the
mwc will not provide pork and the outcome will be as if it is maximizing the utility of the
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legislature as a whole.
If the mwc does provide pork, it will choose a tax rate-public good-public debt triple that
maximizes coalition aggregate utility under the assumption that they share the net of transfer
surplus. Thus, (τ, g, b0) solves the problem:
maxu(τ, g;A) + B(τ,g,b
0;b)
q + δEv(b
0, A0)
s.t. b0 ≤ b,
(4)
where v is the continuation value function. The optimal policy is (τ∗, g∗(A), b∗) where the tax
rate τ∗ satisfies the condition that
1
q
=
[ 1−τ
∗
1−τ∗(1+ε) ]
n
, (5)
the public good level g∗(A) satisfies the condition that
A
g∗(A)
=
p
q
, (6)
and the public debt level b∗ satisfies
b∗ = argmax{b
0
q
+ δEv(b0, A0) : b0 ≤ b}. (7)
To interpret condition (5) note that (1−τ)/(1−τ(1+ε)) measures the marginal cost of taxation -
the social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. It exceeds unity whenever
the tax rate (τ) is positive, because taxation is distortionary. Condition (5) therefore says that
the benefit of raising taxes in terms of increasing the per-coalition member transfer (1/q) must
equal the per-capita cost of the increase in the tax rate. Condition (6) says that the per-capita
benefit of increasing the public good must equal the per-coalition member reduction in transfers
it necessitates. Condition (7) says that the level of borrowing must optimally balance the benefits
of increasing the per-coalition member transfer with the expected future costs of higher debt next
period. We will discuss this condition further below.
The mwc will choose pork if the net of transfer surplus at this optimal policy B(τ∗, g∗(A), b∗; b)
is positive. Otherwise the coalition will provide no pork and its policy choice will maximize
aggregate legislator (and hence citizen) utility. Conveniently, the equilibrium policies turn out to
solve a constrained planning problem:
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium value function v(b,A) solves the functional equation
v(b,A) = max
(τ,g,b0)
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u(τ, g;A) + B(τ,g,b
0;b)
n + δEv(b
0, A0) :
B(τ, g, b0; b) ≥ 0, τ ≥ τ∗, g ≤ g∗(A), & b0 ∈ [b∗, b]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(8)
and the equilibrium policies {τ(b,A),g(b,A),b0(b,A)} are the optimal policy functions for this pro-
gram.
The objective function in problem (8) is average citizen utility. A social planner would therefore
maximize this objective function without the constraints on the tax rate, public good level and
debt. Thus, political determination simply amounts to imposing three additional constraints on
the planning problem. The only complication is that the lower bound on debt b∗ itself depends
upon the value function via equation (7) and hence is endogenous.
Given Proposition 1, it is straightforward to characterize the equilibrium policies. Define the
function A∗(b, b0) from the equation B(τ∗, g∗(A), b0; b) = 0. Then, if the state (b,A) is such that
A is less than A∗(b, b∗) the tax-public good-debt triple is (τ∗, g∗(A), b∗) and the mwc shares the
net of transfer surplus B(τ∗, g∗(A), b∗; b). If A exceeds A∗(b, b∗) the budget constraint binds and
no transfers are given. The tax-debt pair exceeds (τ∗, b∗) and the level of public good is less than
g∗(A). The solution in this case can be characterized by obtaining the first order conditions for
problem (8) with only the budget constraint binding. The tax rate and debt level are increasing
in b and A, while the public good level is increasing in A and decreasing in b.
The characterization in Proposition 1 takes as fixed the lower bound on debt b∗ but as we
have stressed this is endogenous. Taking the first order condition for problem (7) and assuming
an interior solution, we see that b∗ satisfies
1
q
= −δE[∂v(b
∗, A0)
∂b0
]. (9)
This tells us that the marginal benefit of extra borrowing in terms of increasing the per-coalition
member transfer must equal the per-capita expected marginal cost of debt. Using Proposition 1
and the Envelope Theorem, it can be shown that:
−δE[∂v(b
∗, A)
∂b0
] = [G(A∗(b∗, b∗)) +
Z A
A∗(b∗,b∗)
(
1− τ(b∗, A)
1− τ(b∗, A)(1 + ε))dG(A)]/n. (10)
The intuition is this: in the event that A is less than A∗(b∗, b∗) in the next period, increasing
debt will reduce pork by an equal amount since that is the marginal use of resources. This has
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a per-capita cost of 1/n. By contrast, in the event that A exceeds A∗(b, b∗), there is no pork, so
reducing debt means increasing taxes. This has a per-capita cost of (1− τ)/[n(1− τ(1+ ε))] when
the tax rate is τ .
Substituting (10) into (9), observe that since 1/q > 1/n, for (9) to be satisfied, A∗(b∗, b∗) must
lie strictly between A and A. Intuitively, this means that the debt level b∗ must be such that next
period’s mwc will provide pork with a probability strictly between zero and one.
3.4.2 Equilibrium dynamics
The long run behavior of fiscal policies in the political equilibrium is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique, non-degenerate invariant
distribution whose support is a subset of [b∗, b). When the debt level is b∗, the tax rate is τ∗, the
public good level is g∗(A), and a minimum winning coalition of districts receive pork. When the
debt level exceeds b∗, the tax rate exceeds τ∗, the public good level is less than g∗(A), and no
districts receive pork.
In the long run, equilibrium fiscal policies fluctuate in response to shocks in the value of the public
good. Legislative policy-making oscillates between periods of pork-barrel spending and periods of
fiscal responsibility. Periods of pork are brought to an end by high realizations in the value of the
public good. These trigger an increase in debt and taxes to finance higher public good spending
and a cessation of pork. Once in the regime of fiscal responsibility, further high realizations of
A trigger further increases in debt and higher taxes. Pork returns only after a suitable sequence
of low realizations of A. The larger the amount of debt that has been built up, the greater the
expected time before pork re-emerges.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic evolution of debt under the assumption that there are just
two public good shocks, high and low, denoted AH and AL. The horizontal axis measures the
initial debt level b and the vertical the new level b0. The dashed line is the 45o line. The Figure
depicts the two policy functions b0(b,AH) and b0(b,AL). In the first period, given the initial debt
level b0, debt jumps up to b∗ irrespective of the value of the shock. In the second period, debt
remains at b∗ if the shock is low, but increases if the shock is high. It continues to increase for
as long as the shock is high. When the shock becomes low, debt starts to decrease, eventually
returning to b∗ after a suﬃciently long sequence of low shocks.
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Figure 1: Evolution of debt
The debt level b∗ plays a key role in equilibrating the system. If it is positive, the economy is
in perpetual debt, with the extent of debt spiking up after a sequence of high values of the public
good. When it is negative, the government will have positive asset holdings at least some of the
time. The key determinant of b∗ is the size of the tax base as measured by R(τ∗) relative to the
economy’s desired public good spending as measured by pg∗(A). The greater the relative size of
the tax base, the larger is b∗.12
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium behavior with the planning solution for this econ-
omy. The latter is obtained by solving problem (8) without the lower bound constraints on taxes
and debt, and the upper bound constraint on public goods. The solution involves the government
gradually accumulating suﬃcient bonds so as to always be able to finance the Samuelson level of
the public good solely from the interest earnings. Thus, in the long run, the tax rate is equal to
zero. In each period, excess interest earnings are rebated back to citizens via a uniform transfer.
4 Calibration to the U.S.
This section describes how to compute the political equilibrium of the BC model and how we
calibrate it to the U.S. economy. It then discusses the fit of the model and performs some simu-
12 The empirically relevant case for the U.S. economy is of course that b∗ is positive.
12
lations to see how well the model captures the behavior of the key fiscal policy variables. Some
limitations of the model are also discussed.
4.1 Numerical implementation and computation
The “state-space” of the BC model is the set of (b,A) pairs such that b ≤ b and A ∈ [A,A].
We discretize this state-space by assuming that the preference shock A belongs to a finite set
A = {A1, ..., AI} and requiring that the debt level b belongs to the finite set B = {b1, ..., bu}. We
assume that the lowest debt level b1 is equal to the level that a planner would choose in the long
run; that is, b1 = −pgS(AI)/ρ where gS(AI) is the Samuelson level of the public good associated
with the maximal shock AI . We will discuss how the maximum debt level bu is chosen below.
The characterization in Proposition 1 suggests a simple algorithm to compute the laissez-
faire equilibrium. Given a value of b∗, (8) is a functional equation that can be solved for the
equilibrium value function v(b,A). The equation has a unique solution since the mapping defined
by the maximization on the right hand side of (8) is a contraction. The only diﬃculty is that the
lower bound b∗ is endogenously determined along with the value function. However, this diﬃculty
can be overcome by exploiting the fact that b∗ solves the maximization problem described in (7).
These observations motivate the following computational procedure:
• Step 1. Choose some z ∈ B as a value for b∗ and obtain the values τ∗ and g∗(A) from
equations (5) and (6) respectively.
• Step 2. Solve for vz by iterating on the value function below
vz(b,A) = max
(τ,g,b0)
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u (τ, g) +A ln g + B(τ,g,b
0;b)
n + δEvz(b
0, A0)
B(τ, g, b0; b) ≥ 0, g ≤ g∗(A), τ ≥ τ∗, & b0 ∈ [z, bu].
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
• Step 3. Calculate
argmax{b0/q + δEvz(b0, A0) : b0 ∈ B}.
• Step 4. If the optimal value calculated in Step 3 is not z, select another z ∈ B as a value
for b∗ and repeat the procedure. If the optimal value is z, then z is the estimate of b∗ and vz
is the estimated equilibrium value function.13 The equilibrium policy functions can then
13 In fact, once we obtain an approximated value for b∗, we refine the search by allowing the threshold z to be
a real number and use a bisection method to obtain a more accurate approximation (interpolating the expected
value function using Chebyshev polynomials).
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be obtained by solving the constrained planning problem described in Step 2.
Eﬀectively, our computational procedure searches for a b∗ that is a fixed point of the above system.
Intuitively, we are searching for the value of b∗ that determines a value function for which the
mwc would actually choose to borrow b∗ when providing pork to its members.
In our numerical implementation, we use a 200-point grid A for the preference shocks. We
choose the grid B for debt so that further increases in the number of points neither change the
lower bound b∗ nor the value of the key statistics we attempted to match (more detail on this
when discussing the calibration). The resulting set B has 4000 non-evenly spaced grid points,
which are more concentrated at values of debt greater than zero. A global approximation method
is used in the computation of the equilibrium.
4.2 Calibration
We normalize the number of districts to n = 100. Consistent with Cooley and Prescott (1995),
we set the discount factor δ equal to 0.95. This implies that the annual interest rate on bonds ρ
is 5.26%. Following Aiyagari et. al. (2002) and consistent with the measure used in Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988) for a similar disutility of labor function, we assume the elasticity
of labor supply ε is equal to 2. The wage rate w is normalized so that the value of GDP when the
tax rate is τ∗ is 100. This implies a value of w equal to 0.72. Finally, the relative price of public
to private goods p is set equal to 1.
In terms of the shock structure, we assume that in any period, the economy can be in one of
two regimes: “normal times” or “extraordinary times”. The former captures shocks to spending
that occured mostly in the post-war period (including medium size wars such as Vietnam and
Iraq), while the latter tries to capture the extraordinary expenditure levels that occured during
World War II. In normal times, A is log-normally distributed with mean μ and variance θ2, so that
log(A) ∼ N(μ, θ2). In extraordinary times, log(A) is equal to μw > μ implying that the demand
for public good provision (i.e., defense) is higher. The assumption that there is no volatility in
A during extraordinary times is just made for simplicity. We further assume that the economy is
in normal times 95.5% of the time and in extraordinary times 4.5% of the time. This is because
there were three years during our 66 year sample (the World War II years 1942-45) in which
government spending was particularly large. In normal times, the shocks are discretized using
Tauchen’s method.
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We calibrate five parameters in all: the three parameters of the shock distribution μ, μw,
and θ; the required number of votes needed for a proposal to be approved by the legislature q;
and the upper bound on debt bu. While it may seem natural to set q equal to 51%, in the U.S.
context super-majority approval of budgets will typically be necessary to overcome the threats
of presidential vetos or Senate filibusters. Rather than trying to guess an appropriate value
based on institutional considerations, we decided to infer q from the data. We choose to calibrate
bu because setting it equal to the theoretical upper bound on debt b = maxτ R(τ)/ρ creates
diﬃculties matching all the moments. In particular, the average debt/GDP ratio predicted by
the model is too high. We think that this reflects the fact that the theoretical upper bound is
unrealistically high. More specifically, since repaying b would imply setting all future public good
provision equal to zero, we suspect that the government would in fact default if saddled with this
amount of debt. We are not sure what is the true maximum amount the government could borrow
and so, again, we try to infer it from the data.
We choose our five parameters to match five target moments in the data. The first two targets
are the normal times (i.e., excluding the World War II years) mean and variance of government
spending as a proportion of GDP in the U.S. during the period 1940-2005. The third is the
maximum value of government spending as a proportion of GDP. The final two are the average
and maximum ratio of government debt to GDP during 1940-2005.14 Our five parameters are
chosen so that the model generates, under the stationary distribution, close to the same values
that are observed in the data. The resulting values, together with other relevant parameters, are
listed in Table 1.
n δ ε w p μ μw θ q bu
100 0.95 2 0.72 1 -1.05 -0.12 0.13 55.2 91.7
Table 1: Model Parameters
14 All the moments used in the calibration are constructed from the dataset contained in “Historical Statistics of
the United States”, Millennial Edition, Cambridge University Press (2008). The series for the ratio of government
spending to GDP is constructed from the Treasury series (which ranges from 1789 to 1970) and the OMB series
(ranging from 1940 to 2005), and includes Total Federal Expenditures, net of interest payments (all as a fraction
of GDP). The measure of Total Expenditures includes Defense, Social Security and Veteran’s Compensations (so
“mandatory” expenditures will be taken into account when calibrating average spending). The series of government
debt corresponds to Federal Public Debt.
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4.3 Model fit
Table 2 summarizes the model’s fit for a set of selected variables that compose the government’s
budget. The first column reports government spending as a percentage of GDP during normal
times (GSn/GDP), while the second column includes the war years (GS/GDP). The third column
reports the ratio of government debt to GDP (GD/GDP), while the fourth reports government
revenue as a proportion of GDP (GR/GDP). In our model, the latter is simply the proportional
income tax rate τ .
The top two rows report the model’s simulated means and variances, and the bottom two rows
their counterparts in the data. The model’s statistics are based on a numerical approximation to
the theoretical invariant distribution of debt.15 The mean and standard deviation of normal times
spending as a ratio of GDP (listed in bold in the first column), as well as the mean debt/GDP
ratio (listed in bold in the third column), are three of our five target values, and thus match the
data well by construction.
GSn/GDP GS/GDP GD/GDP GR/GDP=τ Pork/GS
Model Mean 17.37% 18.43% 56.98% 21% 0.015%
Stdev 2.33% 5.40% 18% 1% 0.375%
Data Mean 17.36% 18.18% 56.19% 17% n.a.
Stdev 2.32% 5.49% 20% 3% n.a.
Table 2: Model Simulation vs Data
The mean government spending/GDP ratio during World War II was also one of our target
moments. The model delivers 40.5% while the data counterpart is 40%. Note that the mean of
government spending/GDP (second column) predicted by the model matches the data well. Since
this mean is a combination of the two conditional means (normal times and extraordinary times),
with the weights determined by the probability of war, this suggests that our approximation of
the shock process is accurate.
Consistent with tax smoothing principles, we see from Table 2 that the volatility of the gov-
ernment debt/GDP ratio in the data is much higher than that of the government revenue/GDP
15 Using the theoretical distribution approach resulted in more robust estimates of the moments than the alter-
native of simulating the economy for a given length of time.
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ratio (20% for the former, 3% for the latter). Despite the fact that we did not directly target the
debt/GDP volatility, the model generated a value quantitatively similar to that observed in the
data. The predicted volatility of revenue/GDP is much lower than in the data suggesting that
there is more tax smoothing going on in the model than in the actual economy. Nonetheless, the
average revenue/GDP ratio generated by the model is very much in line with the data. The last
column shows the long-run average level of pork as a proportion of total spending. This low value
reflects the fact that in the long run debt is rarely at a level that makes pork likely.16 The dis-
crepancy associated with this prediction is diﬃcult to assess without a clear way of distinguishing
pork and public goods empirically.
There are two other statistics not reported in Table 2 that are nonetheless important to men-
tion. The first one, is the targeted maximum debt/GDP ratio. The model delivers an expected
value of the maximum debt/GDP ratio of 120.6%, very close to the 121% observed in the data.
The second statistic, not a target value, is the lower bound on the debt/GDP ratio. In the data,
during the period 1940-2005 this was never below 31.5%. Encouragingly, the lower bound gen-
erated by the model–calculated as b∗/E(y)–is 29.4%. Thus, the political frictions captured by
the model generate quantitatively a realistic and endogenous lower bound for debt. Moreover,
the long-run stationary distribution of debt/GDP that our model generates is in line with that
observed in the U.S. as seen in Figure 2.
The fact that the model delivers such a good fit with the actual distribution of the debt/GDP
ratio should not be overlooked. It is very diﬃcult to explain the observed debt distribution with
a normative model. As noted earlier, the planner’s solution converges to a steady state where
the government has suﬃcient assets to finance the Samuelson level of the public good with the
interest earnings and taxes are zero. Obviously such a prediction is untenable. Aiyagari et. al
(2002) showed that a non-degenerate distribution for debt could be generated by imposing an
ad-hoc lower bound on debt (i.e., an upper limit on how many assets the government could hold).
However, as they observe, it is not clear why the government should face such a constraint. The
BC model provides a theoretical resolution of this diﬃculty and our calibration shows that, for
the U.S., this resolution works rather nicely empirically.
16 The probability that pork is provided when the debt level is b is G(A∗(b, b∗)). Equations (9) and (10) tell us
that this probability must be reasonably large when b = b∗ but it turns out to decrease sharply for larger b. Thus,
if in the long run debt is unlikely to be close to b∗, the probability that pork is provided will be small.
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Figure 2: Stationary distribution of debt/GDP
4.4 Simulations
To test how well the model captures the behavior of the key policy variables, we simulated the
economy for the period 1940-2005. As an initial condition, we assumed that debt/GDP in the
model was identical to that in the data. We further assumed that the economy was in normal
times until 1942, where we hit the system with an extraordinary times shock for three years. After
that, we assume the economy remains in normal times for the remainder of the sample. Given the
initial value of b and the sequence of shocks, we computed the evolution of government spending,
revenues, and debt.
The left hand panel of Figure 3 shows the time paths of spending and revenue as a proportion
of GDP in the data. Revenues are much more stable than spending reflecting the government’s
tax smoothing. The right hand side show the impulse-responses from the model. The Figure
shows the model nicely replicates the tax smoothing behavior observed in the data.
The U.S. government financed the massive increase in public spending during World War II
largely by issuing debt. The increase in the government debt/GDP ratio can be seen in Figure 4,
which also depicts the behavior of debt for our simulated economy. Notice that the model captures
the jump in debt very well. Another interesting thing to note is that while government spending
18
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
time
%
 o
f G
DP
US Data
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
time
%
 o
f G
DP
Model
revenues
s pend ing
revenues
s pending
Figure 3: Response to a war shock, data (left panel) vs model (right panel)
decreased rapidly after the shock, the level of debt drops back at a much lower speed. While we
capture this qualitatively, our model over-predicts debt persistence. This may be due to the fact
that the model abstracts from changes in the growth rate experienced by the U.S. in the 1950s.
The model also has diﬃculty in explaining the up-turn in the debt/GDP ratio in the mid 1980s.17
4.5 Some limitations
We feel that the calibrated BC model provides a surprisingly good fit of the data given its sim-
plicity. In particular, the fit of the debt distribution illustrated in Figure 2 is very encouraging.
This provides some justification for using the model to analyze how imposing a balanced budget
amendment would impact the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, the model has many limitations and
we discuss four of the most important ones here.
Although dynamic, the BC model does not allow for persistent growth. Since there has been
substantial growth in the U.S. economy over the period in question, to calibrate the model it
is necessary to match the predictions of the model concerning policies as a proportion of GDP
17 Azzimonti, DeFrancisco and Quadrini (2009) argue that this up-turn is due to the international liberalization of
capital markets, which made foreign borrowing more accessible, leading to higher government debt. In the current
environment, a decrease in the interest rate faced by legislators around 1985 would also result in an increase in
debt/GDP but such an experiment is beyond the scope of this paper.
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with the data on policies as a proportion of GDP. Matching policy levels, even when corrected for
inflation, would not be possible. But this raises the question of whether the equilibrium behavior of
fiscal policies that the model predicts would emerge in a growing economy. For example, would the
debt/GDP ratio in a growing economy behave the same as the debt/GDP ratio in the stationary
economy? This is an open question.
A second limitation concerns entitlements spending. We included Social Security and Medicare
spending in our computation of the government spending/GDP ratio. Expenditure on these
programs has grown significantly since World War II and this is primarily responsible for the
upward trend in the spending/GDP ratio exhibited in the left panel of Figure 3. In calibrating
the model, we target the average spending/GDP ratio over the entire 1940-2005 period. Thus,
our shock structure does not incorporate the increase in spending observed in the latter part of
our sample period.
A third limitation concerns the assumed constant marginal utility of consumption. This as-
sumption means that, given the interest rate ρ, citizens are indiﬀerent over the time path of their
consumption. This results in consumption being more volatile in the model than in the data.18
The assumption also implies that the interest rate is constant so that the model cannot capture
18 The standard deviation of consumption as a proportion of GDP is 5.4% in the model and 3.8% in the data.
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variations in interest rates.19
A final limitation concerns the neglect of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Since the recession
began in 2008, the debt/GDP ratio has risen sharply in the U.S.. In part, this has reflected
eﬀorts to stimulate the economy via Keynesian pump-priming. This important motive for deficit
spending is absent from the model.20
5 The impact of a strict BBR
We are now ready to analyze the impact of imposing a strict BBR on the economy. We model a
strict BBR as a requirement that tax revenues must always be suﬃcient to cover spending and
the costs of servicing the debt. If the initial level of debt is b, this requires that
R(τ) ≥ pg +
X
i
si + ρb. (11)
Given the definition of B(τ, g, b0; b) (see (3)), a BBR is equivalent to adding, in each period, the
feasibility constraint that b0 ≤ b; i.e., that debt cannot increase. Thus, under a BBR, next period’s
feasible debt levels are determined by this period’s debt choice. In particular, if debt is paid down
in the current period, that will tighten the debt constraint in the next period. We first study what
can be said qualitatively about the impact of a BBR and then turn to the calibrated model.
5.1 Qualitative analysis
Under a BBR, the equilibrium will still have a recursive structure. Let {τc(b,A),gc(b,A),b0c(b,A)}
denote the equilibrium policies under the constraint and vc(b,A) the value function. As in the
unconstrained equilibrium, in any given state (b,A), either the mwc will provide pork to the
districts of its members or it will not. If the mwc does provide pork, it will choose a tax-public
good-debt triple that maximizes coalition aggregate utility under the assumption that they share
19 In addition, with a diminishing marginal utility of consumption, the government will have incentives to
manipulate the interest rate in its favor. Given a lack of commitment, this would cause further distortions in a
political equilibrium. For a discussion of this, see Lucas and Stokey (1983) for the benevolent planner case, and
Azzimonti, deFrancisco and Krusell (2007) for an analysis under majority voting.
20 Battaglini and Coate (2009) develop a version of the BC model with persistent government revenue shocks
arising from business cycles. However, their analysis does not incorporate a Keynesian role for fiscal policy.
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the net of transfer surplus. Thus, (τ, g, b0) solves the problem:
maxu(τ) +A ln g + B(τ,g,b
0;b)
q + δEvc(b
0, A0)
s.t. b0 ≤ b.
The optimal policy is (τ∗, g∗(A), b∗c(b)) where the tax rate τ∗ and public good level g∗(A) are as
defined in (5) and (6), and the public debt level b∗c(b) satisfies
b∗c(b) ∈ argmax{
b0
q
+ δEvc(b0, A0) : b0 ≤ b}. (12)
As in the case without a BBR, if the mwc does not provide pork, the outcome will be as if it
is maximizing the utility of the legislature as a whole. Following the logic of Proposition 1, we
obtain:
Proposition 3. Under a strict BBR, the equilibrium value function vc(b,A) solves the functional
equation
vc(b,A) = max
(τ,g,b0)
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u(τ) +A ln g + B(τ,g,b
0;b)
n + δEvc(b
0, A0) :
B(τ, g, b0; b) ≥ 0, τ ≥ τ∗, g ≤ g∗(A), & b0 ∈ [b∗c(b), b]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(13)
and the equilibrium policies {τc(b,A),gc(b,A),b0c(b,A)} are the optimal policy functions for this
program.
As in Proposition 1, the equilibrium can be expressed as a particular constrained planner’s
problem. There are two key diﬀerences created by the BBR. First, there is an additional constraint
on debt - an upper bound, b0 ≤ b. Second, the endogenous lower bound on debt b∗c(b) will be a
function of b. Because of these two features, the set of feasible policies is now state dependent as
well as endogenous. Determining the shape of the function b∗c(b) will be crucial to the analysis of
the dynamics and the steady state of the equilibrium. Before turning to this, however, note that
we can use Proposition 3 to characterize the equilibrium policies for a given function b∗c(b). If A is
less than A∗(b, b∗c(b)) the tax-public good-debt triple is (τ∗, g∗(A), b∗c(b)) and the mwc shares the
net of transfer surplus B(τ∗, g∗(A), b; b∗c(b)). If A is greater than A∗(b, b∗c(b)) the budget constraint
binds and no transfers are given. The tax rate exceeds τ∗, the level of public good is less than
g∗(A), and the debt level exceeds b∗c(b). In this case, the solution can be characterized by solving
problem (13) with only the budget constraint binding and the constraint that b0 ≤ b.
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5.1.1 Characterization of the function b∗c(b)
The function b∗c(b) tells us, for any given initial b, the debt level that the mwc will choose when
it provides pork. To understand what b∗c(b) is, it is first useful to understand what it cannot be.
Suppose that the expected value function Evc(b,A0)were strictly concave (as is the case without
a BBR). Then the objective function of the maximization problem in (12) would also be strictly
concave and there would be a unique bb such that b∗c(b) = min{bb, b}. Thus, for any b larger thanbb, whenever the mwc chooses to provide pork, it would choose the debt level bb. If this were the
case, however, a contradiction would emerge. To see why, note that for initial debt levels b belowbb, the BBR would always be binding so that b0c(b,A) = b for all A. On the other hand, for debt
levels above bb, there will be states A in which the BBR will not bind so that b0c(b,A) < b. This
means that when b is below bb, a marginal reduction of debt would be permanent: all future mwcs
would reduce debt by the same amount. By contrast, for b above bb, a marginal reduction in debt
would have an impact on the following period, but it would aﬀect the remaining periods only in
the states in which the BBR is binding. Indeed, when the BBR is not binding, b∗c(b) would equalbb, and so would be independent of b. It follows that the marginal benefit of reducing debt to the
left of bb would be higher than the marginal benefit of decreasing debt to the right of bb. But this
contradicts the assumption that the expected value function Evc(b,A0) is strictly concave.
The essential problem with a b∗c(b) function of the form min{bb, b} is that the marginal eﬀect
of b on b∗c(b) changes too abruptly at bb, from one to zero. In equilibrium, the debt level the mwc
chooses when it provides pork and the BBR is not binding must change more smoothly. This is not
possible when the expected value function is strictly concave, because the maximization problem in
(12) has a unique solution which allows no flexibility in choosing b∗c(b). If the equilibrium expected
value function is concave, therefore, it must be weakly concave. Weak concavity does not pose
the same problem since it allows for the possibility that there are a range of debt levels that solve
the maximization problem in (12). Suppose this is the case and let b0 denote the smallest of these
and b1 the largest; that is,
b0 = min argmax{b
0
q
+ δEvc(b0, A0)}, (14)
and
b1 = maxargmax{b
0
q
+ δEvc(b0, A0)}. (15)
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Then any point in [b0, b1] will solve the maximization problem in (12). If the initial debt level b
is smaller than b0, then we must have b∗c(b) = b. But if the initial debt level b exceeds b0 then the
associated b∗c(b) could be any point in the interval [b0,min{b, b1}]. This extra flexibility suggests
that there may exist a function b∗c(b) which guarantees that the expected value function is indeed
weakly concave. Fortunately, this is not only the case, but there exists a unique such function.
To make all this more precise, define an equilibrium under a strict BBR to be well-behaved
if (i) the expected value function is concave and diﬀerentiable everywhere, and (ii) the function
b∗c(b) is non-decreasing and diﬀerentiable everywhere. In addition, let (τb(A), gb(A)) be the tax
rate and public good level that solve the static maximization problem
max
(τ,g)
½
u(τ) +A ln g +
B(τ, g, b, b)
n
: B(τ, g, b, b) ≥ 0
¾
. (16)
Then we have:
Proposition 4. There exists a unique well-behaved equilibrium under a strict BBR. The associated
function b∗c(b) is given by:
b∗c(b) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
b0 if b ≤ b0
f(b) if b ∈ (b0, b1)
f(b1) if b ≥ b1
, (17)
where the point b0 solves the equation
G(A∗(b0, b0)) +
Z A
A∗(b0,b0)
µ
1− τb0(A)
1− τb0(A)(1 + ε)
¶
dG(A) =
n
q
, (18)
the function f(b) solves the diﬀerential equation
n
q = G(A
∗(b, f(b)))
h
1− df(b)db δ
³
1− nq
´i
+(nq )(1− δ)G(A∗(b, b))− (
n
q )G(A
∗(b, f(b))) +
R A
A∗(b,b)
³
1−τb(A)
1−τb(A)(1+ε)
´
dG(A)(1− δ) + δ nq
(19)
with initial condition f(b0) = b0, and the point b1 solves the equation
n
q
(1− δ) = n
q
(1− δ)G(A∗(b1, b1))−
µ
n
q
− 1
¶
G(A∗(b1, f(b1))) +
Z A
A∗(b1,b1)
µ
1− τb1(A)
1− τb1(A)(1 + ε)
¶
dG(A)(1− δ).
(20)
Proof: See Appendix.
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The function b∗c(b) is tied down by the requirement that the objective function in the maxi-
mization problem (12) must be constant on the interval [b0, b1]. In a well-behaved equilibrium,
this implies that −δE∂vc(b0, A0)/∂b0 = 1/q. Since the derivative of the expected value function
depends upon the function b∗c(b) and its derivative, this implies that b∗c(b) satisfies a diﬀerential
equation with appropriate end-point conditions. This diﬀerential equation and its end-points are
spelled out in Proposition 4 and derived in its proof.
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium function b∗c(b). The figure highlights two key properties of
this function that will govern the dynamic behavior of the equilibrium. The first property is that
b0 is strictly less than the level of debt that is chosen by the mwc when it provides pork in the
unconstrained case (i.e., b∗). This is immediate from a comparison of (10) and (18). The second
is that for any initial debt level b larger than b0, b∗c(b) is less than b. This follows from the facts
that b∗c(b0) = b0 and db∗c(b)/db is less than 1 for b larger than b0.
b0
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b*
f(b1)
b1 b
b*c(b)
Figure 5: The lower bound b∗c(b).
5.1.2 Dynamics and steady state
We now turn to the dynamics. Since in the unconstrained equilibrium, debt must lie in the interval
[b∗, b), we assume that when the BBR is imposed the initial debt level is in this range. We now
have:
Proposition 5. Suppose that a strict BBR is imposed on the economy when the debt level is in
the range [b∗, b). Then, in a well-behaved equilibrium, debt will converge monotonically to a steady
state level b0 smaller than b∗. At this steady state level b0, when the value of the public good is less
25
than A∗(b0, b0), the tax rate will be τ∗, the public good level will be g∗(A), and a mwc of districts
will receive pork. When the value of the public good is greater than A∗(b0, b0), the tax rate will be
τb0(A), the public good level will be gb0(A), and no districts will receive pork.
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand this result, note first from Propositions 3 and 4 that b0c(b0, A) = b0 for all A
so that b0 is a steady state. The key step is therefore to show that the equilibrium level of debt
must converge down to the level b0. Since debt can never increase, this requires ruling out the
possibility that debt gets “stuck” before it gets down to b0. This is done by showing that for
any debt level b greater than b0, the probability that debt remains at b converges to zero as the
number of periods goes to infinity.
Figure 6: Evolution of debt under a BBR
Figure 6 illustrates what happens to debt in the two shock case depicted in Figure 1. The
Figure depicts the two policy functions b0c(b,AH) and b
0
c(b,AL). When the shock is high, the
constraint that debt cannot increase is binding and hence b0c(b,AH) = b for all b ≥ b0. When the
shock is low, however, the constraint is not binding and the mwc finds it optimal to pay down
debt. Given an initial debt level exceeding b∗, debt remains constant as long as the shock is high.
When the shock is low, debt starts to decrease. Once it has decreased, it can never go up because
of the BBR constraint. Debt converges down to the new steady state level of b0.
We can now use Proposition 5 to compare policies at the new steady state with long run
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policies in the unconstrained equilibrium.
Proposition 6. At the steady state debt level b0, the average primary surplus is lower than the
long run average primary surplus in the unconstrained equilibrium. In addition, the average level
of pork-barrel spending is higher.
Proof: See Appendix.
Recall that the primary surplus is the diﬀerence between tax revenues and public spending other
than interest payments. Thus, the first part of this result implies that steady state average tax
revenues must be lower under a BBR and/or average public spending must be higher. It should be
stressed, however, that this result only refers to the long run. In the transition to the new steady
state, at least initially, taxes will be higher and public good spending will be lower as revenues
are used to reduce debt.
The above analysis provides a reasonably complete picture of how imposing a BBR will impact
fiscal policy. However, we are also interested in the impact on citizens’ welfare. When it is first
imposed, it seems likely that a BBR will reduce contemporaneous utility. When A is low, instead
of transfers being paid out to the citizens, debt will be being paid down. When A is high, the
increase in taxes and reduction in public goods will be steeper than would be the case if the
government could borrow. Thus, in either case, citizen welfare should be lower. As debt falls, the
picture becomes less clear. On the one hand, citizens gain from the higher average public spending
levels and/or lower taxes resulting from the smaller debt service payments. On the other hand,
the government’s ability to smooth tax rates and public good levels by varying the debt level is
lost. Thus, there is a clear trade-oﬀ whose resolution will depend on the parameters. The welfare
issue is therefore fundamentally a quantitative question and to resolve it we need to turn to the
calibrated model.
5.2 Quantitative analysis
The computation of the equilibrium is much easier with a strict BBR than without because the
function b∗c(b) can be directly solved for. To see this, note that the steady state value of debt
b0 can be computed directly from equation (18), since the tax function τb(A) can be obtained
by solving the static problem (16). Given this, the function f(b) can be found immediately by
solving the diﬀerential equation (19) with initial condition f(b0) = b0, and the end point b1 can
27
be found using equation (20).21 Once the function b∗c(b) is obtained, policy and value functions
can be computed following Step 2 in the algorithm described above (with the exception that the
constraint on debt is replaced by b0 ∈ [b∗c(b), b]). For the calibrated economy, we find that b0 = 5.9,
a significantly lower value than b∗, which was 29.4.
Table 3 compares fiscal policy variables in the steady state under a BBR with the long run
equilibrium values in the unconstrained case. The most striking diﬀerence is in the government
debt/GDP ratio which is reduced from 56.98% to 6.2% - a 89% decline. The steady state average
government revenue/GDP ratio is lower with a BBR and the mean government spending/GDP
ratio is higher. However, the variance of the government spending/GDP ratio is lower with a BBR
reflecting the fact that public good provision is less responsive to preference shocks. The variance
of tax rates is higher with a BBR, reflecting the intuition that taxes should be less smooth. In
the unconstrained case, the economy can have both responsive public good provision and smooth
taxes by varying debt. This is evidenced by the high variance of the debt/GDP ratio without a
BBR. The Table also shows that the average level of pork as a fraction of government spending
is considerably higher in the steady state under a BBR than in the long run in the unconstrained
case.22
GS/GDP GD/GDP GR/GDP=τ Pork/GS
Without BBR Mean 18.43% 56.98% 21% 0.015%
Stdev 5.40% 18.00% 1% 0.375%
With BBR Mean 19.45% 6.20% 19.78% 2.237%
Stdev 2% 0.34% 2% 4.814%
Table 3: Long run eﬀects of a BBR
To understand the dynamic impact of imposing a BBR, we simulated the economy by drawing
a sequence of shocks consistent with our calibrated distribution of A. As an initial condition, we
assumed that the government debt/GDP ratio equalled 63% which was the level prevailing in the
21 We use a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method to solve for the diﬀerential equation.
22 Since in both cases pork is a small fraction of government spending, the diﬀerence in spending/GDP ra-
tios across the two regimes translates into a diﬀerence in public good spending/GDP ratios. The public good
spending/GDP ratio is 18.43% in the unconstrained equilibrium and 19.45% with a BBR.
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U.S. in 2005, the last year for which we have data. It took around 70 periods for the economy
to transition to a debt level below b∗ (the equivalent of about a 30% debt/GDP ratio), with the
convergence to the new steady state (about a 6% debt/GDP ratio) occurring at a much slower
speed. Figure 7 compares the dynamics of fiscal policy with and without a BBR. As can be seen
in the first panel of Figure 7, in the unconstrained case (the red line) the government always issues
debt in extraordinary times: with a BBR, however, it is forced to have zero deficits. This induces
a marked downward drift in the evolution of debt.
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Figure 7: Evolution of key variables (- - red benchmark, — blue BBR )
The second panel of Figure 7 measures the debt/GDP ratio. Note that this measure spikes
during extraordinary times even with a BBR. The reason is that, even though debt remains
constant, GDP goes down due to the increase in taxation needed to finance the war. The spike in
taxes during extraordinary times under a BBR is clearly illustrated in the third panel of Figure
7 which nicely illustrates the negative consequences of a BBR for tax smoothing. On the other
hand, the panel also illustrates how a BBR serves to lower average tax rates over time. The fourth
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and final panel of Figure 7 illustrates that public good provision is much less responsive with a
BBR. However, the average level of public good provision rises above the level of provision without
a BBR as debt converges to the new steady state.
Figure 8 looks at the evolution of pork and debt under a BBR. Pork is not provided when the
BBR is initially imposed but is provided with increasing frequency as debt levels decline.
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Steady state welfare under a strict BBR, as measured by Evc(b0, A), is 2.85% higher than the
corresponding long run value without a BBR.23 . This welfare gain reflects the lower cost of debt
service at the new steady state. However, as discussed above, the fact that steady state welfare is
higher does not mean that imposing a BBR will raise welfare because of the costs incurred in the
transition to the new steady state. Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of contemporaneous utility
following the imposition of a BBR. In the first 40 periods, contemporaneous welfare is most of the
time lower under a BBR. However, after the first extraordinary times shock, debt is suﬃciently
lower under a BBR that contemporaneous welfare overtakes that in the unconstrained equilibrium
and exceeds it thereafter even during extraordinary times.24 While this is not obvious from the
Figure, the short run costs are suﬃciently high that imposing a BBR given the level of debt in
23 Long run welfare without a BBR is given by
R
bEv(b,A)dψ(b) where ψ(b) is the stationary distribution of debt.
24 The fact that contemporaneous utility spikes up in war time is just an artifact of how we have modelled war
as an increase in the value of public goods. There are obviously other utility costs of war that are not accounted
for by the model.
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the U.S. in 2005 (our last year of data) will actually reduce welfare. Moreover, this is true for any
initial debt level in the support of the long run distribution in the unconstrained equilibrium.
While the question is purely academic, one can use the calibrated model to ask whether the
U.S. would have been better oﬀ at its founding banning deficits, that is if a strict BBR were
imposed at the beginning of time before the government had accumulated any debt. Assuming
that initial debt equals zero and that b0 (as defined in (18)) exceeds 0, under such a BBR, debt
would remain at 0 forever. Thus, we can quantify the welfare gains of introducing a BBR at
foundation by comparing Evc(0, A) and Ev(0, A) in the calibrated economy.25 We find that such
a ban would have increased welfare by 0.017%.
25 This comparison is the one analyzed in Battaglini and Coate (2008). They prove that if R(τ∗) exceeds pg∗(A),
then it must be the case that Evc(0, A) exceeds Ev(0, A) and a BBR is welfare improving. To see the logic, note
that the condition implies that A∗(0, 0) exceeds A and hence the tax-public good pair would always be (τ∗, g∗(A))
under a BBR. But without a BBR, by Proposition 2, the tax rate would never be lower than τ∗ and sometimes
would be strictly higher and the public good level would never be higher than g∗(A) and sometimes would be
strictly lower. Thus, citizens must be better oﬀ with a BBR. This condition, however, is quite restrictive and is
not satisfied in our calibrated economy.
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6 Impact of a BBR with super-majority override
Now consider the impact of a BBR that can be overruled with the support of q0 > q legislators.
Thus, if the proposer can obtain the support of q0 legislators, he can pass a proposal which runs
a deficit and raises the debt level. Otherwise, the rule binds. Of course, if the proposer is not
planning to raise debt, then he only needs the support of q legislators to pass his proposal. We
now have the following striking result.
Proposition 7. Suppose that a BBR with super-majority override is imposed on the economy
when the debt level is at least b∗. Then the rule will have no eﬀect on fiscal policies and citizens’
welfare.
The logic underlying this result is straightforward. In the long run equilibrium of the uncon-
strained model, a mwc never simultaneously runs a deficit and provides pork. This follows from
the fact that when a mwc provides pork it chooses the debt level b∗ which is the lowest level of debt
in the support of the long run distribution. Thus, whenever the mwc runs a deficit it is eﬀectively
behaving as a planner would and its proposal is therefore supported unanimously. Requiring the
mwc to obtain additional support for its deficit-financed proposal therefore imposes no constraint
on its behavior.
When reflecting on this result, it is important to note that if a BBR with override were
imposed on the economy before debt had risen to equilibrium levels, it would have an eﬀect. This
is because it will constrain the initial surge in deficit-financed pork which increases debt to b∗ and
will therefore shift the debt distribution to the left. The greater the required super-majority, the
larger the shift. This leftward shift in the debt distribution would likely enhance social welfare.
7 Discussion
Our analysis oﬀers a clear account of the social costs and benefits of imposing a strict BBR. The
social cost is less responsive public good provision and greater volatility in tax rates. The inability
to run deficits means that the only way to respond to positive shocks in the value of the public
good is to raise taxes. This leads to sharper tax hikes. Moreover, since the marginal cost of public
funds is higher, public good provision incentives are dampened. The social benefit of a strict BBR
is that the level of debt is reduced. While this reduction imposes short run costs, in the long
run citizens benefit since debt starts out ineﬃciently high. The lower debt burden permits higher
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average levels of public goods and lower taxes.
This account of the social cost of a strict BBR is consistent with the policy debate. The
major drawback of a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. constitution stressed by opponents
is that it reduces the federal government’s ability to deal with emergency spending needs and/or
unexpected revenue shortages. Emergency spending needs include wars, natural disasters, and the
need to pump-prime the economy in recessions.26 Revenue shortages come from business cycle
fluctuations. The inability of the government to run deficits in these circumstances is predicted
to lead to inadequate federal spending and/or excessive taxation.27
The account of the social benefit of a strict BBR is also consonant with the policy debate.
Advocates of a balanced budget amendment certainly see the main goal as being to reduce the
debt burden on the economy. However, the advantage of our analysis is that it spells out an
explicit mechanism by which debt reduction occurs. The analysis is also useful in clarifying what
happens to government taxes and spending. Many advocates seem to assume that a balanced
budget amendment will lead to smaller government. If the size of government is measured by the
tax rate, then our calibrated model suggests that on average this is true (see Table 3). Nonetheless,
average spending on both public goods and pork will in fact increase. This suggests that if the true
goal of a BBR is to reduce government spending, it should be supplemented by tax or spending
limits.
The force leading to debt reduction in our analysis is that a BBR, by restricting future policies,
increases the expected cost of taxation and increases legislators’ incentive to save. It is worth
noting that, in a growing economy, there will be an additional, purely mechanical, force driving
down the debt/GDP ratio. A strict BBR, by banning deficits, amounts to a constraint that the
current level of debt cannot exceed the initial level.28 Accordingly, if GDP is growing, the
debt/GDP ratio must fall even if debt is constant. Exactly how this force will combine with
the force identified by our analysis is an open question, but the direction of the overall eﬀect is
26 Typically, however, the amendments considered by the U.S. Congress specify that the BBR is to be automat-
ically waived in times of war.
27 Inadequate spending tends to be emphasized because the view is that political opposition to tax hikes will
be higher than to spending cut-backs. This reflects the fact that federal spending programs are often targeted to
particular sub-groups of the population, while taxes are paid by a broader group of citizens. In our model, all
citizens are homogeneous in their preferences over public good provision and taxes and therefore these are always
kept in balance.
28 This is as opposed to a constraint that today’s debt/GDP ratio cannot exceed tomorrow’s. In some sense, a
constraint that the debt/GDP ratio cannot grow seems a more natural rule to propose for a growing economy than
a BBR (as argued by Paget (1996)). However, we are not aware of any serious proposal for such a rule.
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unambiguous.
Our quantitative assessment of the relative size of the social costs and benefits is, of course,
highly model dependent. It is interesting to give a sense of the strength of the forces at work, but it
is not intended to be definitive. It is easy to think of factors that could substantially increase both
the costs and the benefits of a BBR. On the cost side, if Keynesian pump-priming could prevent
recessions from deepening, then cramping the federal government’s ability to engage in it might
indeed be very costly. On the benefit side, if reducing government debt would decrease interest
rates and spur private investment and growth, then the benefits of government debt reduction
could be much greater than suggested by our model.29
Imposing a BBR with super-majority override will have no eﬀect according to our analysis.
This conclusion reflects the fact that once debt is at equilibrium levels, deficits are used to finance
only public good spending and not targeted pork. They are therefore supported unanimously.
Thus, while the equilibrium level of debt is excessive, deficits are, in a sense, not excessive in long
run equilibrium. We suspect that this feature reflects the stationary nature of the underlying
economy and would not be robust to including growth. In a growing economy, the debt level will
likely grow over time even when the mwc is providing pork. Thus, rather than being an absolute
level of debt, b∗ would be the debt/GDP ratio that is chosen when the mwc provides pork. If
GDP is increasing, then in order to maintain the debt/GDP ratio at b∗, the mwc will have to
issue new debt and thereby run a deficit. But if the mwc needs super-majority approval to run
a deficit, then it may be constrained in its ability to do so. Accordingly, we expect a BBR with
override might have an eﬀect. Of course, exactly what this eﬀect will be is an open question.
Given the possible non-robustness of our result to introducing growth, we must be cautious in
treating it as a definitive prediction. Nonetheless, we do feel that the result is useful in focusing
attention on the question of exactly how a BBR is supposed to make a diﬀerence when it can be
overridden by a super-majority of legislators. Advocates of a balanced budget amendment usually
support an override to preserve some flexibility, but implicitly assume that a requirement to get
the support of, say, 3/5ths of both Houses of Congress will have bite. Indeed, the discussion tends
to focus on the concern that such a requirement might be too stringent and could lead to hold up
problems with legislators demanding special projects for their districts in exchange for their votes.
29 That said, these considerations would impact the equilibrium level of debt in the unconstrained case so that
the change created by the BBR might be much less dramatic. Of course, this is why an equilibrium analysis such
as ours is necessary to predict the impact of imposing a BBR.
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The theoretical and/or empirical justification for these views is obscure and our result poses an
interesting challenge to them.
8 Conclusion
This paper has made a first attempt to analyze the impact of a balanced budget amendment to the
U.S. constitution. The framework for the analysis has been the political economy model of fiscal
policy recently developed by Battaglini and Coate (2008). The paper has calibrated the BC model
to the U.S. economy using data from 1940-2005 and has analyzed, qualitatively and quantitatively,
the impact of imposing two diﬀerent types of BBRs: a strict rule that cannot be circumvented by
the legislature and a rule that can be overridden by a super-majority of legislators. We hope that
the paper has contributed to the policy debate on the case for a balanced budget amendment, as
well as advanced understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the BC model as a framework
for analyzing U.S. fiscal issues.
We feel that the analysis oﬀers a reasonably compelling vision of the likely impact of a strict
BBR. The key theoretical insight is that imposing a strict BBR will lead legislators to reduce
existing debt levels. By restricting future policies, a BBR increases the expected cost of taxation
and makes public savings more valuable. This reduction in debt has beneficial long run eﬀects
because it reduces the revenues that must be devoted to servicing the debt. These beneficial eﬀects
must be weighed against the costs of less responsive public good provision and more volatile tax
rates. While we are less satisfied with the prediction of the analysis concerning the (non) impact
of a BBR with a super-majority override, we do feel that it is useful in raising the question of
exactly how such a BBR is supposed to make a diﬀerence. This is an important question which
the policy debate has paid insuﬃcient attention to.
In terms of future research, there is obviously much room for improvement in the analysis of
this important policy problem. One obvious next step is to extend the BC model to include growth.
Incorporating growth need not be done in a very sophisticated way to be valuable. Assuming, for
example, that labor productivity is growing exogenously over time would be a good place to start.
What is important is to preserve the tractability of the model and this will be a major challenge.
But, if a tractable extension can be crafted, it would be very interesting to use it to revisit the case
for a balanced budget amendment. We suspect that diﬀerent conclusions concerning the impact
of a BBR with super-majority override would emerge.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We begin by characterizing what the function b∗c(b) must look like in a well-behaved equilibrium.
Using Proposition 3, we can write the equilibrium value function as:
vc(b,A) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
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⎫
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0, A0)
: B(τ, g, b0, b) ≥ 0
⎫
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if A ∈ [A∗(b, b∗c(b)), bA(b)]
u(τ∗) +A ln qAp +
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∗
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n + δEvc(b
∗
c(b), A0) if A < A∗(b, b∗c(b)),
(21)
where bA(b) is the threshold (possibly larger than A) such that for A ≥ bA(b) the BBR constraint
that the debt level be less than b will bind. In this top range, the initial debt level will directly
determine the debt level chosen next period. Using this and the assumption that the equilibrium
is well-behaved, we have that
∂vc(b,A)
∂b
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(22)
Taking expectations, we obtain
−δnE ∂vc(b,A)∂b = G(A∗(b, b∗c(b)))δ[1 + ρ−
db∗c(b)
db − nδE
∂vc(b∗c(b),A)
∂b
db∗c(b)
db ]
+
Rmin{A, bA(b)}
A∗(b,b∗c)
( 1−τc(b,A)1−τc(b,A)(1+ε) )dG(A)
+
R A
min{A, bA(b)}( 1−τb(A)1−τb(A)(1+ε) )dG(A)(1− δ)− δ2nE ∂vc(b,A)∂b (1−G(min{A, bA(b)})). (23)
Now let b0 and b1 be as defined in (14) and (15). As explained in the text, we must have that
b0 is less than b1. We now characterize the end point b0. When b < b0, we know that b∗c(b) = b
and hence that
db∗c(b)
db = 1. Moreover, since b
∗
c(b) = b, we have that bA(b) = A∗(b, b) and so we can
rewrite (23) as:
−δnE∂vc(b,A)
∂b
= G(A∗(b, b)) +
Z A
A∗(b,b)
µ
1− τb(A)
1− τb(A)(1 + ε)
¶
dG(A). (24)
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Since b
0
q + δEvc(b
0, A0) is constant on the interval [b0, b1], the right hand derivative of the value
function at b0 and the left hand derivative at b1 must be 1/q. Since the expected value function is
diﬀerentiable, then, we must have that at b0 the left hand side derivative (which is given by (24))
is 1/q implying that
G(A∗(b0, b0)) +
Z A
A∗(b0,b0)
µ
1− τb0(A)
1− τb0(A)(1 + ε)
¶
dG(A) =
n
q
.
This is (18).
The next step is to characterize b∗c(b) on the interval [b0, b1]. If
b
q + δEvc(b,A
0) is constant on
the interval [b0, b1] we must have that
−δnE∂vc(b,A)
∂b
=
n
q
, (25)
for any b ∈ [b0, b1]. Since E ∂vc(b,A)∂b is a function of b∗c(b) and its derivative, (25) implies a
diﬀerential equation that needs to be satisfied by b∗c(b) along with the initial condition b∗c(b0) = b0.
Using (23), we can show that this condition requires that b∗c(b) in [b0, b1] is equal to a function
f (b) that solves the diﬀerential equation:
n
q = G(A
∗(b, f(b)))
h
1− df(b)db δ
³
1− nq
´i
+(nq )(1− δ)G(A∗(b, b))− (
n
q )G(A
∗(b, f(b))) +
R A
A∗(b,b)
³
1−τb(A)
1−τb(A)(1+ε)
´
dG(A)(1− δ) + δ nq ,
with the initial condition f(b0) = b0. This is (19). Note that if this condition is satisfied, then
any point in [b0, b] would be a legitimate choice for b∗c(b) when b ∈ [b0, b1]. We are therefore free
to choose b∗c(b) as we like - in particular, b
∗
c(b) = f(b). By Theorem 2
0 in Braun (1992) (p.77),
f(b) is uniquely defined on [b0, b].
The final step is to pin down the end point of the interval b1. Because b∗c(b) is non decreasing
and bounded in [b0, b1], it must be constant and equal to f(b1) for debt levels b larger than b1.
Using (23) and the fact that
db∗c(b)
db = 0 for b greater than b1 we have that:
−δnE∂vc(b,A)
∂b
=
G(A∗(b, b∗c(b))) +
Rmin{A, bA(b)}
A∗(b,b∗c(b))
³
1−τc(b,A)
1−τc(b,A)(1+ε)
´
dG(A)
+
R A
min{A, bA(b)}
³
1−τb(A)
1−τb(A)(1+ε)
´
dG(A)(1− δ)
1− δ(1−G(min{A, bA(b)})) . (26)
for b greater than b1. The same logic used to pin down b0 can now be used for b1: at b1 we need
the right hand side derivative (given by (26)) equal to 1/q. This implies that b1 must satisfy:
n
q
(1−δ) = n
q
(1−δ)G(A∗(b1, b1))−
µ
n
q
− 1
¶
G(A∗(b1, f(b1)))+
Z A
A∗(b1,b1)
µ
1− τb1(A)
1− τb1(A)(1 + ε)
¶
dG(A)(1−δ).
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This is (20).
We now have a full characterization of the b∗c(b) function in a well-behaved equilibrium. Notice
that for a given b∗c(b) function, (13) is a contraction with a unique fixed-point. Thus, since b∗c(b)
is uniquely defined, there exists a unique well-behaved equilibrium. ¥
9.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Note first from (13) and (17) that b0c(b0, A) = b0 for all A so that b0 is a steady state. The key
step is therefore to show that the equilibrium level of debt must converge down to the level b0.
Let bb ∈ [b∗, b) denote the debt level that is prevailing when the BBR is imposed. Since the BBR
implies that debt can never go up, what we need to show is that for any b ∈ (b0,bb] the probability
that debt remains at b goes to zero as t goes to infinity.
Given an initial debt level b ∈ [b0,bb], let Hm(b, b0) denote the probability that in m periods
debt will be less than b0 ∈ [b0, b] given the equilibrium debt policy function b0c(b0, A). Suppose
that we could show that for any initial b ∈ (b0,bb] there exists an ε > 0 and an integer m such that
Hm(b, b∗c(b)) exceeds ε. Then we could conclude that for any b ∈ (b0,bb] the probability that debt
remains at b goes to zero as t goes to infinity. To prove this, choose any b ∈ (b0,bb] and let ς > 0.
Then we need to show that there exists some tς such that the probability that debt is equal to b
after tς periods is less than ς. But we know that after t ·m periods the probability that debt will
equal b will be less than [1−Hm(b, b∗c(b))]t < (1− ε)t. By choosing tς such that (1− ε)tς/m ≤ ς
we obtain the desired result.
We now establish:
Claim 1: For any b ∈ (b0,bb], there exists an ε > 0 and an integer m such that Hm(b, b∗c(b)) ≥ ε.
Proof: For any b ∈ [b0,bb] and A ∈ [A,A] define the sequence hφm(b,A)i∞m=1 inductively as follows:
φ0(b,A) = b and φm+1(b,A) = b0c(φm(b,A), A). Thus, φm(b,A) is the equilibrium level of debt if
the debt level were b at time 0 and the shock was A in periods 1 through m.
Recall that, by assumption, there exists some positive constant ξ > 0, such that for any pair
of realizations satisfying A < A0, the diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A) is at least as big as ξ(A0−A). This
implies that for any b ∈ [b0,bb], Hm(b, φm(b,A+λ))−Hm(b, φm(b,A)) ≥ ξmλm for all λ such that
0 < λ < A−A. To see this, let A = (A1, A2, ..., Ak, ...) be a countable vector of shocks such that
Aj ∈ [A,A+λ] for all j = 1, ...,∞, and for allm letAm = (A1, A2, ..., Am) be the list of the firstm
elements. Define also the sequence hφm(b,Am)i∞m=1 inductively as follows: φ1(b,A1) = b0c(b,A1)
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and φk+1(b,Ak+1) = b0c(φk(b,Ak), Ak+1). Clearly φ1(b,A1) ∈ (φ1(b,A), φ1(b,A+ λ)). Assume
that φk(b,Ak) ∈ (φk(b,A), φk(b,A+ λ)), then, since b0c(b,A) is increasing in b and A:
φk+1(b,Ak+1) ∈ (b0c(φk(b,A), Ak+1), b0c(φk(b,A+ λ), Ak+1)
⊂ (b0c(φk(b,A), A), b0c(φk(b,A+ λ), A+ λ)
= (φk+1(b,A), φk+1(b,A+ λ))
It follows that φk+1(b,Ak+1) ∈ (φk+1(b,A), φk+1(b,A+ λ)). This implies that after m periods, if
the initial state is b and if there are m sequential shocks Aj ∈ [A,A+ λ], then debt will certainly
be in (φm(b,A), φm(b,A+ λ)). The probability that after m periods, if the initial state is b, debt
is in (φm(b,A), φm(b,A+ λ)) must therefore be larger than the probability of m sequential shocks
Aj ∈ [A,A+ λ]. This probability is at least (ξλ)m .
Given this, to prove the Claim it suﬃces to show that there exists an integer m such that
A∗(φm(b,A), b∗c(b)) > A. If this is the case by continuity there is a λm(b) > 0 small enough such
that A∗(φm(b,A+ λm(b)), b∗c(b)) > A. It then follows that
Hm(b, b∗c(b)) =
Z
z
H1(z, b∗c(b))dH
m−1(b, z)
≥
Z φm(b,A+λm(b))
φm(b,A)
H1(z, b∗c(b))dH
m−1(b, z)
≥ H1(φm(b,A+ λm(b)), b∗c(b))
£
Hm−1(b, φm−1(b,A+ λm(b)))−Hm−1(b, φm−1(b,A))
¤
≥ H1(φm(b,A+ λm(b)), b∗c(b)) (ξλm(b))
m−1 > 0.
The third inequality follows from the facts that H1(b, b0) is non-increasing in b and φm(b,A +
λm(b)) ≥ φm(b,A).
It remains to show that there exists an integer m such that A∗(φm(b,A), b∗c(b)) > A. Suppose,
to the contrary, that for all m we have that A∗(φm(b,A), b∗c(b)) ≤ A. To simplify notation, let
φm = φm(b,A) for all m. The BBR implies that for all m, φm−1 ≥ φm. We can therefore assume
without loss of generality that the sequence hφmi converges to some finite limit φ∞ ≥ b0. Since
A∗(φm, b∗c(b)) ≤ A and φm ≤ b, we know that G(A∗(φm, b∗c(φm))) = 0. Thus from (23) we have
that for all m
−δnE∂vc(φm, A)
∂b
=
Rmin{A, bA(φm)}
A (
1−τc(φm,A)
1−τc(φm,A)(1+ε))dG(A) +
R A
min{A, bA(φm)}( 1−τφm (A)1−τφm (A)(1+ε) )dG(A)(1− δ)
1− δ(1−G(min{A, bA(φm)}) .
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But we know that it must be the case that
τc(φm, A)
1− τc(φm, A)(1 + ε)
≥ −δnE∂vc(φm+1, A)
∂b
where the inequality is strict if the BBR is binding. This means that
τc(φm, A)
1− τc(φm, A)(1 + ε)
≥
Rmin{A, bA(φm)}
A (
1−τc(φm+1,A)
1−τc(φm+1,A)(1+ε) )dG(A) +
R A
min{A, bA(φm)}( 1−τφm (A)1−τφm (A)(1+ε) )dG(A)(1− δ)
1− δ(1−G(min{A, bA(φm)})
where the inequality is strict if the BBR is binding. Note however that if φm+1 is suﬃciently close
to φm then since τc(b,A) and τb(A) are increasing in A and
1− δ(1−G(min{A, bA(φm)})) < 1,
the right hand side must be strictly larger than the left hand side, a contradiction. We conclude
therefore that for m suﬃciently large A∗(φm(b,A), b∗c(b)) > A, which yields the result. ¥
The description of what the policies would be at the steady state debt level b0 follows the
characterization following Proposition 3. ¥
9.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We first show that the average primary surplus at the steady state debt level b0 is less than
the average primary surplus in the long run in the unconstrained equilibrium. The primary
surplus is the diﬀerence between tax revenues and spending on the public good and pork. In
the unconstrained equilibrium, using the budget constraint, we may write this as PS(b,A) =
(1 + ρ)b − b0(b,A). Let EPS(b) =
R
PS(b,A)dG(A). Let H(b, b0) be the transition function
implied by the unconstrained equilibrium; that is, the probability that in the next period the
initial level of debt will be less than or equal to b0 ∈ [b∗, b) if the current level is b. Let ψ(b) denote
the long run equilibrium debt distribution. This satisfies the condition that
ψ(b0) =
Z
b
H(b, b0)dψ(b).
(For the details see Battaglini and Coate (2008)). Then we have that the average primary surplus
in the long run in the unconstrained equilibrium is
bZ
b∗
EPS(b)dψ(b) = (1 + ρ)E(b)−
bZ
b∗
b0dψ(b0) = ρE(b)
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From Proposition 5, we know that the average primary surplus in the steady state under a strict
BBR is just ρb0. We also know that b0 < b∗. Thus we have that
bZ
b∗
EPS(b)dψ(b) = ρE(b) > ρb∗ > ρb0,
as required.
We next show that the average level of pork-barrel spending at the steady state debt level b0
is larger than the average amount of pork-barrel spending in the long run in the unconstrained
equilibrium. By Proposition 5, average pork-barrel spending at the steady state debt level b0 is
given by
A∗(b0,b0)Z
A
B(τ∗, g∗(A), b0, b0)dG(A).
Average pork-barrel spending in the long run in the unconstrained equilibrium is
bZ
b∗
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A∗(b,b∗)Z
A
B(τ∗, g∗(A), b∗, b)dG(A)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
dψ(b),
where ψ(b) is the invariant distribution. We have that
bZ
b∗
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A∗(b,b∗)Z
A
B(τ∗, g∗(A), b∗, b)dG(A)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
dψ(b) ≤
A∗(b∗,b∗)Z
A
B(τ∗, g∗(A), b∗, b∗)dG(A)
<
A∗(b0,b0)Z
A
B(τ∗, g∗(A), b0, b0)dG(A),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that b0 < b∗. ¥
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